The doctrine is simple to expound. It has a flavor of antiquity. It lends itself so beautifully to syllogistic reasoning that it may well be a relief to judges a little exhausted by their daily grind of making doubtful guesses and exercising close judgment in other branches of the law. It may even afford a feeling of rejuvenation as it leads to speculation about this little cause of action that stayed at home and this that went to market. There is little else that can be said for it. When we look to its results, we find decisions reaching the paradox that in the case of local actions the only court having jurisdiction may have to dismiss the action on grounds of venue, and the only court satisfying the requirement of venue may lack jurisdiction; while in the case of transitory actions the physical power criterion may sometimes create undue obstacles to the prosecution of meritorious claims, and sometimes, by affording plaintiffs a wide choice of forums, present an opportunity to vex and inconvenience the defendant out of all proportion to what is necessary for a fair presentation of the plaintiff's own case -or to use the threat of such vexation to coerce settlement of doubtful claims otherwise than on the basis of their merits.
Protest and reaction were inevitable. Courts have criticized the doctrine even when they felt compelled by precedent to adhere to it. As the instances where theory was obviously out of line with common sense became more and more frequent, these ceased to be regarded as the occasional " hard cases " against which judges should steel themselves lest they make bad law. Recurrent pressure of facts compelled the drawing of distinctions on other grounds than logic, and the rendering of decisions that can not be explained in terms of the old dogma. Legislation has played an important part in the process.
The problem of adjustment cuts across a number of the traditional subdivisions of law: procedure, the law of associations, private international law, and constitutional law. In the field of constitutional law it concerns itself with the full faith and credit clause, the due process clause, the commerce clause, the equal pro- defendant was subject to suit in the very county in Wisconsin where the damaged land was. It was apparently assumed, and at any rate has been frequently reiterated by subsequent Minnesota decisions, that once an action is held to be transitory it can not be dismissed on grounds of convenience. Thus it was open to the dissenting judge to question whether the new rule might not involve more frequent injustice to defendants than the old to plaintiffs.
By contrast to the development in Minnesota, the Massachusetts court has expanded the category of local actions to relieve itself from the burden of a litigation peculiarly difficult to try away from its source.6 An action was brought for conversion of ore, traditionally a transitory action, but here involving determination of difficult questions of fact concerning the subterraneous courses of veins and lodes in an Arizona mine and the application of unfamiliar rules of law. It was held that in substance the action was for injury to land and therefore local. The dismissal of the action accorded with sound policy, since the Arizona courts were open to the plaintiff. It would be most unfortunate, however, if the case should become a precedent for enlarging the category of local actions where the result, as in the Livingston v. Jefferson situation, is to impose arbitrary limitations regardless of convenience.
Far more significant and far more complicated has been the development with regard to transitory actions, first in making it easier for the plaintiff to find a convenient forum with jurisdiction, and later in limiting his choice on grounds of convenience. Joint debtor acts were passed to permit suit on joint claims after service on less than all of the joint debtors, with the possibility of execution against joint property and property of the debtors served. Similar statutes have been enacted to facilitate suit on claims against firms.7 Foreign corporation acts have made corporations subject to suit wherever they do business.8 Attempts have been 10 A casual examination of the CORPORATION MANUAL for I929 indicates that in over thirty states the Blue Sky Laws require the appointment of a process agent as a prerequisite to obtaining a license to deal in securities. Some expressly apply to individual dealers, others to "investment companies" which are elsewhere defined to include partnerships or private individuals. Some are expressly confined to claims growing out of violations of the act or the sale of securities, others to causes of action arising within the state, and in others the language is broad enough to include causes of action wherever arising.
11 See SCOTT, FUNDAMENTALS OF PROCEDURE 4I. 12 See Dodd, supra note 8. 13 Garnishment laws have made it possible to enforce claims against a defendant in a particular state, merely because the defendant's debtor happens to wander into, or do business in, that state.14 It is no longer, if indeed it ever was, a safe generalization that it is fair to defendants that trial take place wherever they may be " found." On the contrary, all defendants who travel, or are owed debts, or whose businesses transcend the limits of single states, are potentially subject to suit in many places which may be highly inconvenient. The actual instances of resulting unfairness to defendants have been too frequent to be ignored. They have led to various attempts at correction.
In studying these attempts one is struck by the constant recurrence of two questions. The first is one of policy: assuming that a court must choose between a place of trial inconvenient for the plaintiff and another about equally inconvenient for the defendant, whose interest should prevail? The second is a question of method. It is only another phase of the eternal problem of the law-where to draw the line between predicability and flexibility. One possibility is to create a new set of rules of thumb essentially like the traditional system, modernized to accord more frequently with convenience, but based on a consideration of only such easily determined factors as residence of parties and the place where the cause of. action arose.15 The other possibility is tecting the attached property, conceding jurisdiction as to it, but urging against its sale that plaintiff's claim is not meritorious. They do not question the power to condition any consideration of the merits on the defendant's appearing generally. 14 15 The ambiguity lurking behind this seemingly definite concept is discussed infra pp. I227-28. The older technique involves consideration only of the complaint, and guesses from it as to the proper issues.
to inquire into the issues actually in dispute and the testimony actually needed to meet them, and to regard the determination of the proper place of trial as a matter to be settled in each individual case after a careful weighing of all factors.
II
One line of development involves exceptions to the newer bases for jurisdiction, particularly over foreign corporations, in order to exclude suits which it seems more reasonable not to try within the state. These exceptions may arise by express language in the statutes, by a judicial rule of construction limiting the scope of seemingly broader language, and conceivably also by constitutional limitations on the power which a state can give to its courts.
A situation which arises often enough to influence the development is one where the local forum is obviously inappropriate because the facts relied on by plaintiff occurred, and the parties and presumably their witnesses reside, in another state whose courts are available. The plaintiff's selection of the local forum appears to be plainly vexatious. Under these circumstances no one questions the propriety of not entertaining the action. One way of preventing such a suit is to deny jurisdiction as to it. But the question arises as to how sweeping the rule of exclusion shall be.
A formula expressed in some recent Supreme Court decisions, perhaps as a constitutional limitation, and in any event as a rule for construction of state legislation, looks only to the origin of the cause of action and does not take into consideration either the character of the issues or the residence of the plaintiff. There have been various expressions of it, confining jurisdiction to " suits in respect to business transacted within the state "16 or " controversies growing out of transactions within the state," 17 The formula affords a convenient explanation for dismissing some of the vexatiously imported suits, but it goes farther than is necessary for this purpose. If consistently adhered to, it would preclude, for instance, suing a foreign corporation on a foreign claim even after it had been reduced to judgment,19 and prevent a plaintiff from attaching local assets in a suit on an indisputable and liquidated claim. In these instances the only effect of the rule would be to obstruct the plaintiff without in any way furthering trial convenience. Again the rule would in many cases impose severe hardships on plaintiffs who reside in or near the state but whose causes of action have no other connection with it. A typical case is one where the plaintiff has a tort claim for injuries sustained while temporarily in a distant state. Here choice must be made between competing interests of plaintiff and defendant. There is at least no compelling argument of policy for preferring the place of trial convenient for the defendant. If the language of a statute is broad enough to cover such a case, considerations of policy should be more than evenly balanced to make an exception of it. The burden of the argument would be shifted to the plaintiff only by treating the suggested rule of construction as though it were itself a legislative enactment, and making the question not one of construing the act but of construing the court's construction of it. This is construction squared.
Where the words used afford no clue as to what the legislature would have intended had it thought of the case, the writer's best guess is that it would have favored permitting an injured individual to sue at the place convenient for him, although inconvenient for the foreign corporation. The assumed larger resources of the defendant and the ability to shift its burdens to the ultimate consumer may justify such an attitude. A provincial desire to give the benefit of the doubt to its own citizens may also have some influence on the judicial or legislative attitude.
In Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane,20 the Supreme Court itself seemed more impressed by the hardship of compelling an American plaintiff to go to Ireland to sue than the alternative of requiring a British corporation to defend, in a federal court in New York, a claim for a tort committed in Irish territorial waters. Kane was a resident of New Jersey, but, so far as appears, defendant was not doing business there, and New York was the only possible place for trial in this country. The claim was for an assault alleged to have been committed while plaintiff was on a tender taking him to one of defendant's ships in the harbor of Londonderry for transportation to New York. In addition to the hardship on plaintiff of getting himself to Ireland to participate in the trial, it was likely that fellow passengers whom he would want as witnesses would be more available in New York than at the port of debarkation. A state statute 21 confined non-residents to suing on causes of action arising within the state, and there was no federal statute as to service. The Court held that state legislation can not limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts, and found the common law warrant enough for proceeding after service on an actual agent of the defendant.
State legislation affects the jurisdiction of the federal courts only when service is on a person who is designated by or pursuant to the statute as agent for process but is not otherwise an agent of the corporation. It is here that occasion arises for construction by the federal court. Assuming that the statutory method of service involves adequate notice to the defendant, there is no reason why the resultant jurisdiction should be less broad than in the case of service on an actual agent. To give the statutory method a narrower scope would serve only as a trap for the unwary. Unless the Barrow Steamship case is to be considered overruled, it justifies the hope that no such nice distinctions will be drawn.
Although the rule of construction is laid down in cases more recent than the Barrow Steamship case, none of these presented any good reasons of policy for sustaining the jurisdiction. Old Wayne Life Ass'n v. McDonough 22 and Simon v. Southern Ry.,23 sometimes cited in this connection, concerned the validity of default judgments against corporations which had done local business without complying with the foreign corporation acts. In each case process had been served on a public official designated by statute who had no duty to notify the defendant. In neither case did the defendant receive notice prior to judgment. Thus the invalidity of the judgments might have been rested on the lack of such notice as amounts to due process.24 In two cases plaintiffs were domestic corporations suing on contracts made and to be performed elsewhere.25 A corporation, desiring to sue on a foreign contract in the state of its incorporation, does not present a case at all comparable to that of an individual plaintiff, seeking relief at his home on account of a foreign tort. The agents who must act and testify for the corporation are as likely to be available at the place of contract or performance as in the state of incorporation. An additional ground for distinguishing these two cases is that in each the defendant had ceased doing business in the state prior to the action, although there had been no formal effort to revoke the process agent's authority. were joined as defendants. The Southern objected to the jurisdiction. The objection was overruled, although the only connection between the injury and its Louisiana business was that the ticket was sold to the plaintiff by an agent of the Louisville & Nashville pursuant to a joint traffic agreement with the Southern. The Southern was otherwise engaged in business and had designated a process agent whom the plaintiff had served. It was conceded that participation in benefits of joint tickets sold by other carriers does not in itself constitute engaging in local business of the kind which subjects a foreign corporation to suit. Yet it was held that the sale of the ticket to Chatters was part of the Southern's Louisiana business and that the injury arose out of it. One wonders whether, in case a Virginia resident had been injured there, while on a local train, the statute would have been construed as applicable merely because he bought his ticket in Louisiana -whether the decision was influenced by the need for testimony as to the condition of the car when it left Louisiana, or the convenience to the plaintiff of being able to join the Kentucky and Virginia corporations in one action. One wonders also whether Chatters would have been denied the privilege of suing in his home state for an injury sustained in Virginia, if he had broken his journey en route and had bought his ticket piecemeal, or in case he was returning to New Orleans on a ticket sold in Washington.
The chief significance of the Chatters case is to suggest that the supposed rule of thumb has no definite meaning in advance of decision, and affords no real advantage in certainty to compensate for occasional arbitrariness in application. Is " business transacted within the state " equivalent to a " transaction within the state," and can a cause of action " arise " within the state although not connected with any corporate action within the state? Assuming agreement can be had as to the correct phrasing of the rule, the Supreme Court may deal less reverently with its own dicta than inferior federal courts. It may mold future interpre-tations along lines of convenience, while the cases that do not get beyond the lower courts meet with more technical treatment, or with treatment either technical or practical according to the judge before whom the issue arises. Thus the rule does not obviate the uncertainty incident to differences of judgment as to what policy may require. It merely adds an element of uncertainty, as to when matters of policy will be deemed relevant.29
Besides actions against carriers, other situations will occur where the plaintiff's cause of action is in part the result of a contract made in one state, and in part the result of facts subsequently occurring in another. Insurance policies may be issued in one state and claims may be made in respect to losses occurring in another.30 Contest may be with respect to the validity or going into effect of the policy, the existence of a loss within its terms, performance of conditions as to the giving of notice and furnishing proof of loss, or perhaps there may be a question of waiver of such conditions. Is it enough that some conceivable issue under the policy may involve acts transpiring within the state, or must it appear likely from the complaint that all possible issues arose within the state, or will the court be impressed by what it assumes to be the most common issues arising under policies? Such questions of policy will have their part in determining the application of the test according to where the cause of action arises. Unfortunately emphasis on origin of the cause of action, rather than of the facts at issue, precludes inquiring as to what the actual ground of contest will be, and deciding with reference to it. A rule that jurisdiction over foreign causes of action depends upon whether the plaintiff is a resident or non-resident,3' would 29 See CLARK, CODE PLEADING (i928) 75-87, 308-II, 45I-57, for a discussion of similar difficulty in interpreting such concepts as cause of action, and transaction, as used in code provisions. 30 Statutes to the effect that contracts on lives or property within a state shall be deemed to have been made in the state, will not prevent such questions from arising, as they do not cover cases where the property is taken or the insured goes to another state after the policy is made. 
III
All the foregoing arguments against a sweeping construction of foreign corporation acts excluding all foreign suits apply with even greater force against a similarly broad constitutional limitation under the due process clause. Once a defendant is subject to suit for any purpose, the due process clause can at most exclude jurisdiction as to actions which it is manifestly unreasonable to try within the state. This is true regardless of what theory is adopted as to the basis for jurisdiction over foreign corporations.33 It may be unreasonable to " imply " consent as to certain suits. It may be an unreasonable regulation of the local business of the corporation to provide for local action as to certain suits. It may even be so unreasonable and arbitrary as to deny due process notwithstanding the corporation's " presence." But the unreasonableness dealt with by the due process clause must be more than disagreement with the Supreme Court's views on a matter of policy. Conceivably the Court may think it unsound to prefer plaintiff's to defendant's convenience in fixing the place of trial. It may think that the ease of administering a rule of thumb makes it 32 Discussion of this point is reserved for treatment in a subsequent article. 33 See Note (I929) 42 HARV. L. REV. io63, for a summary of theories of consent, presence, doing of business, and doing of acts. The " act " theory is the most recent, and does not purport to be an exclusive explanation. It is confined to jurisdiction over claims arising out of the act done within the state. was deciding a point of constitutional law. On the other hand, the cases have subsequently been cited as dealing with construction of the state acts. At any rate, as pointed out in previous discussion of these cases, they are explainable on the ground enunciated in Wuchter v. Pizzutti,76 that unless the public official designated as process agent is required to notify the non-resident defendant, service on him is not sufficiently calculated to inform defendant of the action to constitute due process. They do not justify a holding that there would be a similar limitation on jurisdiction where there is a requirement that notice be given. Again, as was urged in discussing the supposed rule of construction, there is no reason to distinguish between methods of service so long as they tend to give adequate notice. Unless such distinctions are to be drawn, there are at least three cases, two prior to, and one later than, the Old Wayne and Simon cases, upholding jurisdiction as to foreign causes of action. They are all cases where process was served on an actual agent of the corporation. The only question seems to be whether the due process clause precludes jurisdiction where no such interest of the plaintiff is involved. Those arguing that " presence " of the foreign corporation within the state is the true basis for jurisdiction over it contend that such presence should have the same consequences to it as physical presence of an individual has to him.38 The antiquity of the practice of subjecting an individual to suits wherever he may be found precludes him from invoking the due process clause, and why should the ill-favored foreign corporation fare better? One can only guess whether the argument for companions in misery will prevail upon the Supreme Court. administration of justice clearly does not require that a foreign carrier shall submit to a suit in a State in which the cause of action did not arise, in which the transaction giving rise to it was not entered upon, in which the carrier neither owns nor operates a railroad, and in which the plaintiff does not reside." 41 Mr. Justice Brandeis has also written all of the decisions developing the doctrine of the Davis case. They display his characteristic reluctance to make sweeping generalizations, and leave undecided many questions as to when the orderly administration of local justice will justify the burden on interstate commerce incident to the trial of foreign causes of action. The fact that there are debts or tangible assets of the defendant within the state will not justify a clearly vexatious suit.42 Nor will the fact that the suit is brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.4" Change of residence by the plaintiff after the cause of action arose will not justify suit in the new and remote forum -at least not without a showing that the plaintiff has some motive for the change other than to facilitate bringing suit."4 In all of the cases where the defendant succeeded in dismissing the suit, it had no line of railroad within the state, and apparently its local business was exclusively interstate in character. Whether the doctrine will apply to carriers also engaged in intrastate commerce or at all to other corporations remains undecided.45
IV
It has been held that there was no unreasonable burden on inter- state commerce where the plaintiff had a usual place of business within the state and sued in connection with a shipment deliverable in the state, and where " for all that appears " the negligence complained of occurred there.46 A suit in the state of the defendant's incorporation and in a county through which its road ran, was upheld, although the plaintiff did not reside and the cause of action did not arise within the state, and notwithstanding the defendant's affidavit that it would have to bring in eleven witnesses. There was no showing of any interest of the plaintiff in the forum he had selected; but it was less than 200 miles from the place where the accident had occurred, and hence the burden was not very great.47
How are these cases to be fitted into the scheme which draws a distinction between venue and jurisdiction, and between jurisdiction over the defendant and jurisdiction over the subject matter? They do not involve jurisdiction over the subject matter, for it is " elementary " that this objection can not be waived even by the defendant's express submission to the court, and it is hard to believe that the objection could be raised after a defense on the merits.48 It is not easy to conceive of an objection to jurisdiction over the person as depending on the residence of the plaintiff and the place of origin of the claim. Moreover, in the Davis case " it was assumed that the carrier had been found within the State." 4 Clearly the objection has nothing to do with the physical power concept of jurisdiction, in view of its 46 Possibly the Wells case may be explained as a peculiar consequence 'of the Texas practice and is not authority for a general holding that the commerce clause objection may be used for collateral attack. Unless the Wells case really is authority to the contrary, it would seem that whenever a carrier is " found " within a state it is thereby subject to an initial determination, in the court where plaintiff's action is pending, of the issue whether the exigencies of local administration of justice justify the burden on interstate commerce incident to entertaining the action. Since the facts relied on by the carrier are such as may be shown by affidavit and the argument may be made by local counsel, geography has comparatively little to do with the burden of trying this issue. The burden is substantially the same in whatever court it is first presented, for in any event an adverse ruling may ultimately be reviewed by the United States Supreme Court. On the other hand, it may be very important to the plaintiff, if he has " plucked the wrong sow by the ear," that he find it out promptly. To allow The objection based on the due process clause has a different history, and serves, or rather served historically, a different purpose. It goes back to the physical power criterion of jurisdiction and to the period prior to the Fourteenth Amendment when federal constitutional law concerned itself only with when a state could pronounce such judgment as would be entitled to faith and credit. The requisite power to do this either existed or it did not, and no judicial or legislative fiat could create it. Thus default could not preclude defendant's claiming the judgment was a nullity when it was sued on in another state. Can the Island of Tobago bind the whole world? 56 In I878 the case of Pennoyer v. Neff 7 brought the due process clause into the picture, holding that unless there was jurisdiction over defendant a default judgment must be treated as a nullity even in the state where rendered. It was assumed that the test of jurisdiction was the same whether the question arose under the full faith and credit clause or the due process clause. The one required respect for a valid judgment; the other prevented giving effect to a void judgment.58 56 Paraphrasing Lord Ellenborough in Buchanan v. Rucker, 9 East i9i (i8o8).
95 U. S. 7I4 (I878).
58 See Dodd, supra note 8, at 433; Magruder and Foster, supra note 7, at First used merely for collateral attack, the due process clause was later found available as a means of direct attack -by special appearance and motion to dismiss or by plea or answer in abatement, whichever might be the local practice for objecting to the jurisdiction. Assuming the constitutional point has been appropriately presented and passed upon by a state court, the mere pronouncement of the judgment may be held a violation of the due process clause.59 Thus direct attack under the due process clause is possible wherever there might be collateral attack under it, or notwithstanding the full faith and credit clause.
But motions to quash, pleas in abatement, and so forth, may be appropriate to present objections to proceeding with an action which are not strictly jurisdictional in the narrow sense of the word. For instance, there may be a statutory rule of venue on which the defendant is relying, or he may challenge the rule of venue on which the plaintiff is relying, as unreasonably discriminatory and depriving him of equal protection of the laws.60 Included in this class also there may be objections based on the due process clause and perhaps, as suggested above, that of a foreign corporation subject to suit for some purposes, against vexatiously imported suits. This type of objection, if valid, would have nothing to do with the physical power concept of jurisdiction and is more like the objection which carriers have been permitted to urge under the commerce clause. Hence possibly these objections can only be urged directly. The unfortunate limitations of our legal vocabulary would permit the same word jurisdiction to be used in connection with both types of objections.
The excuse for the foregoing elaborate and perhaps unduly holding that the due process clause is not violated by a state practice which confines defendant to collateral attack as a means of invoking the protection of the clause. That the mere rendering of a judgment by a court without jurisdiction may be a deprivation of property, becomes easy to understand when we conceive of special appearances as giving a court power to pass on its own jurisdiction, subject to ultimate review by the Supreme Court, so that on failure to appeal the jurisdictional issue may become res judicata. See Note (1928) action was begun, plaintiff could be required to stipulate to waive it, or he might be required to cooperate in expediting trial.
The fact that the court has jurisdiction over the parties and can pass intelligently on the appropriateness of the foreign forum does not prove that it is proper for it to do so. The real question is whether any court other than that invoked to decide the merits of a controversy should decide initially whether the latter is the appropriate court to do so. The possibility of retaliation must give courts pause before they tread on one another's toes. It has always been regarded as a very delicate matter to interfere with the free access of suitors to another court of equal dignity and competent jurisdiction.63 The domestic forum does not have the excuse of acting defensively to prevent embarrassing interference with its own administration of justice, for it has not been asked to make any decision on the merits, and usually can not be invoked by the person against whom a claim is pending, to adjudicate his non-liability.64 Nor is there ordinarily any substantial advantage, based on its location, of having the home court determine the proper place for trial. Matters of fact affecting the question are for the court and are normally settled by affidavits, and it is a relatively simple matter to engage local attorneys by correspondence to make whatever argument is necessary.65 The principal reason for issuing injunctions is fear that the foreign court will not decide the issue properly, and conviction that the home state has a strong interest in having the issue determined according to its own views. Fear of the foreign court's decision must be based on a rule of law to which it is committed, and not on a distrust of its ability to act fairly and impartially in the exercise of the discretion open to it.66 If the foreign court would dismiss an action on the ground that it is not an appropriate forum, there would be no excuse for the local equity court arrogating to itself the decision of this issue. Injunctions are granted on the assumption that the foreign forum will entertain transitory actions whenever the defendant is subject to its jurisdiction. That this may also be the view of the home court, will not prevent an injunction from issuing.67 The injunction is used not because there is any need for an equitable remedy, nor because of any advantages of equity practice, but to secure a new deal where the rule at law seems to have reached an unsatisfactorily rigid state.
There is an analogy in the closely related question of enjoining foreign actions brought to " evade " the local law. To simplify analysis, it will be assumed that both parties live where the cause of action arose. This has been the situation in most cases where 66 as the place of trial. This feeling is doubtless responsible for the tendency of some American and most continental courts to classify many of these as matters of substance and apply the lex loci. The more orthodox Anglo-American courts of law seem to ignore these practical considerations in order to preserve the logical symmetry of the distinction between procedure and substantive law. The only escape has been resort to equity, which has enforced its view that the local law should govern, by confining the law plaintiff to suit in a local court of law.69 The commonest and most generally accepted instances for issuing the injunction are to prevent " evasion " of the local exemption and insolvency laws.70 There is less authority for and more criticism of injunctions to prevent the law plaintiff from taking advantage of more favorable foreign rules for determining the issues of fact -or as to what may be a defense.7" Where the equity plaintiff can only show that the foreign procedure decreases his chance of victory without being at all certain to lead to a different result, he has little chance of getting his injunction." There must be a strong case.
Assuming an injunction is obtained, will it be of avail to the law defendant? 7 The efficacy of the injunction depends upon whether the foreign court will recognize it as a reason for dismissing the law action brought or continued in defiance of it. Does the full faith and credit clause require recognition of it? It is hard to see why the equity decree should be entitled to any greater recognition than a statute of the same state prohibiting the export of causes of action."5 There is no finding of fact with respect to the matter in dispute between the parties -only an expression of the local policy with respect to the place where trial ought to take place. At one time there was doubt whether the equity court could issue an injunction without denying full faith and credit to the judicial proceedings of the foreign law court. This difficulty was circumvented by saying that it was not the foreign court but the equity defendant whose action was enjoined.7" If the equity decree were entitled to full faith and credit, the injunction would be in everything but form an order restraining the foreign court itself. Accordingly there is almost no substantial authority for compulsory recognition of the decree in the foreign law court.77
It seems doubtful whether the problem would be greatly changed by Congress passing the American Bar Association bill for extending the full faith and credit clause to all equitable decrees. While Congress is given power to prescribe the manner in which public acts, records, and judicial proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof,78 the existing legislation, which dates from I790, seems so far as judicial proceedings are concerned to be as sweeping as the constitutional grant of power. After providing for the manner of authenticating another state's records and exemplifications it requires that they " shall have such faith and credit given The statutory paraphrase of the constitutional provision makes the existing decisions turn on the extent of the constitutional obligation, and not merely on the interpretation of existing federal legislation. The proposed bill would simplify the procedure in cases where a foreign decree would now be entitled to recognition. Insofar as the bill attempts anything more, its enactment would be significant only as an expression, more specific than heretofore, of how far Congress thinks the full faith and credit clause should extend. As such it would be only persuasive, and not even that except on points still open under the existing decisions. It may be that under the proposed bill or possibly even under existing legislation, faith and credit will be generally extended to such equitable decrees as relate to disposal of the merits of the controversy.80 But before we are ready for compulsory recognition of injunctions against suit in particular courts there must be a clearer demarcation of the extent to which the granting of such injunctions is consistent with due respect for the foreign court of law of the extent to which any court other than the law forum should have ultimate power to decide whether it shall try a cause against a defendant subject to its jurisdiction. Perhaps it is proper to lodge this ultimate power in a court which is at the domicil of both parties and where the cause of action arose. It certainly would not be appropriate to accord such power to every court that happens to get jurisdiction over the law defendant.
A stronger case can be made for discretionary recognition of the equity decree. If the court in which the law action is pending would not as a court of law entertain the law defendant's plea that it is an inappropriate forum, but would as a court of equity issue an injunction to prevent one of its own residents from bringing a vexatious action abroad, it can not regard a similar decree of another court as an unwarranted interference. It should respect the foreign decree and hope that foreign courts will respect its own similar decrees. The same argument would apply in favor of discretionary foreign recognition of injunctions to prevent " evasion " of local exemption laws and the like. 
